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LIMITING THE LIMITED NUMBER OF SHAREHOLDER 
PROPOSALS UNDER RULE 14A-8  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Rule 14a-8 (the Rule) provides shareholders with the opportunity to 
advise corporate action through inclusion of proposals in a company’s 
proxy statement.1 The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or 
Commission) qualified the availability of the provision through a number 
of procedural thresholds for submission as well as substantive grounds 
for exclusion. These include a limit to a single submission per sharehold-
er to each company.2  
When originally adopted, the Rule contained no restrictions on the 
number of proposals. In 1976, however, the SEC responded to purported 
abuse by limiting shareholders to two proposals for each annual meeting. 
The allegations of abuse apparently arose from a small number of indi-
vidual investors submitting a large number of proposals to specific issu-
ers.3 The SEC claimed that the practice threatened the underlying intent 
of the Rule and effective communication between shareholders and issu-
ers.4 Seven years later, the Commission reduced this limitation to a single 
proposal per shareholder per issuer5 as part of a set of amendments de-
signed to restrict utilization of the Rule.6  
The restriction presented problems in implementation. Companies 
often asserted that submissions containing multiple issues constituted 
more than one proposal, circumventing the limitation. The Staff some-
times permitted exclusion on this basis but did so inconsistently. In addi-
  
 1. 17 CFR § 240.14a-8(c) (2016).  
 2. Id.  
 3. Statement of Informal Procedures for the Rendering of Staff Advice with Respect to 
Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No. 12,599, 9 SEC Docket 1040 (Jul. 7, 1976) (citing 
Sec. and Exch. Comm’n., Fortieth Annual Report, 33 (1974)). Per the SEC Annual Reports for 1973 
through 1975, approximately 370 to 400 proposals have been submitted to the Commission annually, 
whereas only 68 were submitted in 1949. SEC. EXCH. COMM’N., Annual Report, 42 (1950); SEC. 
EXCH. COMM’N, Annual Report for Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1975, 51 (1975); SEC. EXCH. 
COMM’N, Fortieth Annual Report, 33 (1974); SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, Thirty-Ninth Annual Report, 37 
(1973).  
 4. Proposed Amendments to Rule 14a-8 Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Relating 
to Proposals by Security Holders (S7-643), Exchange Act Release No. 12,598, 9 SEC Docket 1030, 
1032 (Jul. 7, 1976) (“The Commission is concerned about such practices not only because they 
appear to be an unreasonable exercise of the right to submit proposals, but also because they tend to 
obscure other material matters . . . thereby reducing the effectiveness of such documents.”).  
 5. Proposed Amendments to Rule 14a-8 Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Relating 
to Proposals by Security Holders, Exchange Act Release No. 34-19,135 (Oct. 14, 1982); Amend-
ments to Rule 14a-8 Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Relating to Proposals by Security 
Holders, Release No 34-20,091 (Aug. 16, 1983).  
 6. The Program “is the first comprehensive and coordinated review of the entire system of 
proxy regulation.” Securities Exchange Commission, Federal Securities Law Reports No. 1046, 
Proxy Communications and Management Disclosure, SEC Proxy Review Program 1983, 11 (1983).  
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tion, issuers also contended that proposals submitted by third parties 
should be attributed to the proponent under a theory of control and alter 
ego.  
This article will examine the history of restrictions on the number of 
proposals contained in Rule 14a-8. Part II focuses on the administrative 
history of the procedural requirement, from implementation to current 
amendment. Part III examines the modern interpretations of the require-
ment and its role in how shareholders communicate with corporate man-
agement. Part VI contains an analysis of the procedural requirement, the 
current impact, and suggestions on possible reforms.  
II. ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY 
Section 2.01 Development of the Procedural Requirement 
The Commission adopted the shareholder proposal rule in 1942.7 
The Rule did not initially include a limit on the number of proposals that 
a shareholder could submit to a single company or to multiple compa-
nies.8 Although calls for a limit on the number of proposals occasionally 
surfaced,9 no such restriction appeared until 1976.10  
The 1970s saw widespread activity by “corporate gadflies” and so-
cial activists.11 Groups such as the Medical Community for Human 
Rights12 submitted proposals on public policy matters.13 Their proposals 
addressed topics ranging from employment issues14 to perceived human 
  
 7. 17 CFR § 240.14a-8.  
 8. Rule X-14a-7, Duty of Management to Set Forth Stockholders’ Proposals, adopted on 
Dec. 18, 1942, required only that shareholders provide an issuer with “reasonable notice” of intent to 
present a proposal “which is a proper subject for action by the security holders.” No other limitations 
were placed in the original Rule beyond a 100-word limit for supporting statements. Exchange Act 
Release No. 3347, 1942 WL 34864 at *10 (Dec. 18, 2942). 




 10. Proposed Amendments to Rule 14a-8 Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Relat-
ing to Proposals by Security Holders (S7-643), Exchange Act Release No. 12,598 (Jul. 7, 1976), 9 
SEC Docket 1030. 
 11. See J. Robert Brown, Jr., The Evolving Role of Rule 14a-8 in the Corporate Governance 
Process, 93 DENV. L. REV. ONLINE 151, 157 (2016). Proposals submissions increased from 221 in 
1969 to 602 in 1971.  
 12. In the late 1960’s the Medical Community for Human Rights submitted a proposal to Dow 
Chemical Company recommending the company discontinue the manufacture of napalm. The SEC 
Staff permitted the exclusion of the proposal, prompting the Medical Community to bring suit 
against the SEC. The U.S. court of appeals determined the SEC provided no explanation of support 
for allowing Dow to exclude the proposal; and, interpreting the initial purpose of the Rule as a 
democratic process granting shareholders a means of addressing concerns, remanded the case to the 
SEC for review utilizing a proper limit on its discretionary authority. (Daniel E. Lazaroff, Promoting 
Corporate Democracy and Social Responsibility: The Need to Reform the Federal Proxy Rules on 
Shareholder Proposals, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 33, 53-55). 
 13. Id. at 52-53. While individual “Gadflies” are noted as being active post World-War II, 
many groups sprang up in the Vietnam War era.  
 14. E.g., Continental Airlines, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1975 WL 9898 (Mar. 14, 1975).  
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rights violations in countries such as South Korea and South Africa.15 
During this period, a small number of shareholders submitted proposals 
to multiple issuers, accounting for a large percentage of the total.16 As a 
result, the number of proposals increased significantly,17 generating issu-
er complaints about additional costs.18 
To some degree the Staff addressed concerns over the submission of 
multiple proposals through the creation of a “good faith” standard in 
Rule 14a-8.19 The SEC utilized the approach in response to a practice of 
shareholders submitting proposals to many issuers then failing to attend 
the annual meetings.20 One particular proponent, according to the Staff, 
submitted 189 proposals in a single year to twenty-nine companies,21 but 
failed to attend most of the meetings.22 In noting a lack of “good faith” in 
the practice,23 the Commission warned that proponents engaging in simi-
lar behavior risked disqualification for future submissions.24 
Shareholders submitting multiple proposals to a single rather than 
multiple issuers were not subject to the “good faith” standard. In at least 
one case, a shareholder submitted as many as fourteen proposals to the 
same company, a pattern that repeated over a number of years.25 The 
  
 15. E.g., Motorola Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1976 WL 11032 (Mar. 18, 1976); Ford Motor 
Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1977 WL 462582 (Mar. 14, 1977).  
 16. See Susan W. Liebeler, A Proposal to Rescind the Shareholder Proposal Rule, 18 GA. L. 
REV. 425, 438 n. 86 (1984). A single proponent submitted 148 proposals in 1975, 21.26% of pro-
posals for that year.  
 17. Donald E. Schwartz, An Assessment of the Shareholder Proposal Rule, 65 GEO. L. J. 635, 
637 (citing 32 SEC Ann. Rep. 52 (1966) and 41 SEC Ann. Rep. 51 (1975)).  
 18. The SEC has provided little data on the actual costs to issuers. One issuer provided a 
breakdown of costs to include and exclude proposals in 1976. See infra note 55. Susan Liebeler 
estimated the total cost to issuers in the 1975-1976 season to be $7 million. Liebeler, supra note 17, 
at 454.  
 19. See Memorandum from The Division of Corporate Finance to The Commission (Nov 5, 
1971), supra note 10; Commission Chairman Casey, Remarks on New Proxy Rules, address at the 
Corporate Law Conference, Washington, D.C. (Sep. 21, 1972), cited in The Ingersoll-Rand Co., 
SEC No-Action Letter, 1978 WL 13152 at *8 (Feb. 22, 1978).  
 20. See Memorandum from The Division of Corporate Finance to The Commission (Nov 5, 
1971), supra note 10. 
 21. Id.  
 22. See Ingersoll-Rand Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1978 WL 13152 at *8 (Feb. 22, 1978). In 
that letter, the Staff permitted exclusion of proposals from the same shareholder the following year, 
noting the lack of a serious effort to attend meetings as the justification. Staff claimed this action 
“conserved [Commission] resources and made it easier for companies to protect themselves from 
unnecessary cost and trouble.” Letter from N. McCoy, Chief Counsel, Div. of Corp. Fin., to J. 
Grady, Secretary, IBR Corp. (Dec. 30, 1971) cited in The Ingersoll-Rand Company, SEC No-Action 
Letter, 1978 WL 13152 at *8 (February 22, 1978). 
 23. “Where a security holder submits proposals and then does not appear at the meetings . . . 
regards this practice as an abuse of the rule.” Proposed Proxy Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 34-
9432, 1971 WL 126135 at *1 (Dec. 22, 1971).  
 24. “It should be noted that under paragraph (c)(3) of the rule a security holder who submits 
proposals to a company and then, without good cause, does not appear at the meeting in person . . . is 
disqualified from submitting proposals to the company the following year”. Id.  
 25. GE, in a statement to the SEC, claimed Mr. Brusati submitted the same nine proposals 
over a five-year period prior to 1973. General Electric Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1973 WL 20874 
(Jan. 31, 1973). In the 1974 NAL request, GE claims Mr. Brusati is using the proxy materials as a 
means of publicizing his “campaign against the Company’s stock option plans dating back to 1953.” 
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repeat proposals were often, apparently, identical.26 In one case, the Staff 
permitted omission of the resubmitted proposals through application of 
the exclusion for personal grievances.27 Nonetheless, the Rule provided 
no clear mechanism for addressing these concerns on a systemic basis. 
The Commission sought to address the issue of multiple submis-
sions to the same company in 1976 by, for the first time, imposing limits 
on the number of proposals that a shareholder could submit to an issuer.28 
The SEC asserted several proponents “exceeded the bounds of reasona-
bleness . . . by submitting excessive numbers of proposals to issuers”, 
something that constituted “an unreasonable exercise of the right to sub-
mit proposals”.29  
Proposing a limitation on the number of proposals to two, the SEC 
viewed the change as “not adversely affect[ing] the vast majority of pro-
ponents”.30 The restriction represented a “reasonable restraint” on share-
holder rights.31 Comments on the procedural amendment focused on 
concerns with use of the Rule by shareholder activists and corporate gad-
flies.32 Issuers claimed that the majority of stockholders were indifferent 
to the special interest proposals and frustrated with the unnecessary ex-
penditure of time and resources.33  
  
General Electric Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1974 WL 8843 at *2 (Feb. 6, 1974). It should be noted 
that Mr. Brusati complied with the procedural limitation after its implementation in 1976. See infra 
note 39.  
 26. General Electric Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1973 WL 20874 (Jan. 31, 1973)  
 27. Mr. Brusati is noted as submitting multiple complaints and proposals against GE’s stock 
options plan. The Staff recognized his “campaign against the Company’s stock options plan dating 
back to 1953” as a personal clam or redress of personal grievance and permitted exclusion of the 
proposals for this reason. General Electric Company, WL 8843 at *2-3 (Feb. 6, 1974). 
 28. Proposed Amendments to Rule 14a-8 Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Relat-
ing to Proposals by Security Holders (S7-643), Exchange Act Release No. 12,598 (Jul. 7, 1976), 9 
SEC Docket 1030. 
 29. Id. at 1032.  
 30. The SEC claimed data collected from 1973 to 1976 (uncited) indicated 83% of proponents 
submitted one to two proposals to an issuer annually; Proposed Amendments to Rule 14a-8 Under 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Relating to Proposals by Security Holders (S7-643), Exchange 
Act Release No. 12,598 (Jul. 7, 1976), 9 SEC Docket 1030, 1032. 
 31. Id.  
 32. Union Carbide, commenting on the 1976 Rule amendments stated: “[W]e would like to 
express at the outset our disappointment that the Commission has not dealt in the proposed amend-
ments with a problem that is of growing concern to most stockholders. This is the increasingly 
common practice of individuals or groups having special interests . . . obtaining an unfair share of 
the attention of management and shareholders . . . . Most such proposals are supported by the votes 
of only a tiny percentage of stockholders at the meeting, which not only dismays disinterested stock-
holders but more importantly, restricts the time available to deal with topics that are of major con-
cern to the majority.” Letter from John F. Shanklin, Vice-President and Secretary, Union Carbide 
Corp., to George F. Fitzsimmons, Secretary SEC (Sep. 7, 1976) (SEC File No. S7-643) (emphasis 
added), cited in Timothy L. Feagans, SEC Rule 14a-8: New Restrictions on Corporate Democracy?, 
33 BUFF. L. REV. 225, 221 n.16.  
 33. Id.  
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The Commission adopted the requirement.34 Shareholders could 
submit only two proposals per issuer in any one year.35 The release noted 
that shareholders inadvertently failing to adhere to the requirement 
would have ten business days to correct any violation.36 The SEC also 
recognized the possibility that shareholders would employ tactics de-
signed to evade the requirement.37 
Section 2.02 Revision of Procedural Limitation  
Issues quickly arose in connection with the limitation. In some cas-
es, shareholders submitted more than two proposals to the same compa-
ny. To the extent the excess submissions were not withdrawn following 
notification, the Staff permitted exclusion of all the proposals.38 In other 
cases, however, companies asserted that shareholders included multiple 
issues within the same proposal, effectively circumventing the limitation.  
The issue arose in Newmont Mining Corp.39 The shareholder sub-
mitted a proposal concerning the board of directors. The proposal sought 
to require a detailed history on candidates for the board and the right to 
vote for nominees individually rather than as a group. Newmont Mining 
argued that each matter constituted a separate and distinct proposal. The 
Staff disagreed. The proposal involved a single issue, board elections. 
Only where a submission contained “separate and distinct” business 
items would they constitute separate proposals. 40  
The limit could also be exceeded where proposals submitted by 
third-parties were attributed to the proponent. Attribution would occur 
for any submissions arising from jointly owned shares.41 For example, in 
  
 34. Adoption of Amendments Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, Securities Exchange 
Release No. 12,999, 10 SEC Docket 1006 (Nov. 22, 1976).  
 35. Id. A shareholder may submit to multiple issuers (no more than two per issuer) in a given 
year. The adopted limitation also provided a caveat, that any shareholder in violation of this re-
quirement was provided ten days to resubmit the proposal(s) that was within compliance of the Rule. 
 36. Id.  
 37. “[T]he Commission is aware of the possibility that some proponents may attempt to evade 
the new limitations through various maneuvers, such as having other persons whose securities they 
control submit two proposals each in their own names.” Id. at 1009.  
 38. Mr. J.J. Fitzpatrick submitted nine proposals for inclusion in Merchants Petroleum Com-
pany’s 1979 proxy materials. Merchants Petroleum Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1978 WL 13173 at 
*2 (Oct. 17, 1978). Of note, Mr. Brusati submitted more than two proposals to General Electric in 
1979 and 1981, but reduced to two after receiving notification of this violation by the company. 
General Electric Company, SEC No-Action Letter, 1979 WL 13795 (Jan. 17, 1979); General Elec-
tric Company, SEC No-Action Letter, 1981 WL 24697 (Jan. 29, 1981).  
 39. The proposal under question was the second of two submitted by the proponent. Newmont 
Mining Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1979 WL 13385 (Feb. 23, 1979).  
 40. “Management has asserted that the second proposal…is actually three separate and dis-
tinct proposals. However, it is the Division’s view that the second proposal in fact constitutes only a 
single proposal concerning the procedures to be followed by the Company in elections of directors.” 
Id. at *2. 
 41. “These limitations will apply collectively to all persons having an interest in the same 
securities (e.g., the record owner and the beneficial owner, and joint tenants).” SEC Release 12,999, 
supra note 35, at 1009; see also, Texas Instruments Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1982 WL 28691 
(Jan. 19, 1982).  
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TransWorld Airlines, the Staff permitted exclusion of four proposals 
submitted by two joint owners of the shares.42 In addition, attribution 
could also occur where the third party acted “on behalf of, under the con-
trol of, or as the alter ego” of the proponent.43  
For instance, in TransWorld Corporation,44 the company received 
proposals submitted by four shareholders, all directly related and residing 
together,45 and an institution founded and chaired by one of the propo-
nents.46 The issuer provided evidence that two of the proponents pur-
chased qualifying stock within months of submission and the proposals 
had a unifying theme.47 Additionally, the issuer asserted a continuous 
history of similar proposals submitted by the institution’s founder. The 
Staff found the evidence sufficient to support an alter-ego claim.48  
The Staff generally viewed the limitation of two proposals as effec-
tive.49 Nonetheless, the Commission remained concerned with the num-
ber of proposals submitted annually. Data indicated that 991 proposals 
were submitted to 376 companies in 1981, and 850 submitted to 300 
  
 42. See TransWorld Airlines, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1977 WL 13835 (Feb. 15, 1977); 
“[I]t is the view of the Commission that the limitation upon the number of proposals which may be 
submitted by a proponent applies collectively to all persons having an interest in some securities 
(e.g., joint tenants).” Id. at *2.  
 43. See BankAmerica Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1996 WL 54566 (Feb. 8, 1996); “There 
appears to be some basis for your view that the proposals may be omitted from the Company's proxy 
materials under rule 14a–8(a)(4) because the nominal proponents are acting on behalf of, under the 
control of, or as the alter ego of Aviad Visoly.” Id. at *1.  
 44. TransWorld Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1982 WL 28756 (Feb. 8, 1982).  
 45. The four proponents included a husband, wife and their two children. The qualifying stock 
used for the submission by the wife and one of the children were purchased shortly prior to submis-
sion of the proposals.  
 46. The TWA (TransWorld Airlines) Shareholder Project, Inc. was founded by Fred Catalano, 
who remained the Chairman at the time of these proposal submissions. TransWorld claimed the 
Project was a “dissident” group opposing the company’s current management, and received a con-
sent injunction preventing the Project’s dissemination of proxy materials or materials soliciting 
funding for the project. TransWorld Corp., supra note 45.  
 47. The proposals, all concerning corporate governance, included: reporting on commissions 
paid and large purchase transactions; cumulative voting for board members; and inclusion of em-
ployees to board positions. Per TransWorld each of these proposals is similar to previous proposals 
submitted by the proponent and Project. TransWorld Corp., supra note 45. “[The proponent] and the 
Project have a long, unbroken history of collaboration in opposing the management both of Trans 
Wordl Airlines, Inc. (‘TWA’) and . . . Trans World itself. [The proponent], a former purser whom 
TWA discharged in 1974, is the founder and moving force behind the Project.” Id. at *5.  
 48. Similarly, in Brunswick, a qualified shareholder was notified that his submission violated 
the limited number requirement. He voluntarily retracted two of the four proposal. The issuer then 
received the two proposals, with identical wording, from the proponent’s son-in-law. The issuer 
provided the shareholder’s own statement that the withdrawn proposals would be resubmitted by the 
son-in-law in support of an alter-ego claim. The Staff, citing its own recognition of evasion maneu-
vers, agreed with the issuers’ claim. Brunswick Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1983 WL 30726 (Jan. 
31, 1983). 
 49. Memorandum from Bill Morley and Mike Kargula to Lee B. Spencer, Jr., John Huber and 
Linda Quinn (Mar. 18, 1982), 
http://3197d6d14b5f19f2f4405e13d29c4c016cf96cbbfd197c579b45.r81.cf1.rackcdn.com/collection/
papers/1980/1982_0318_MorleyKargula.pdf.  
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companies in 1982.50 Seven proponents submitted slightly more than 
fifty percent of all proposals both years.51  
In an effort to further restrict use of the Rule, the Commission in 
1982 proposed a broad set of additional limitations, including a reduction 
in the number of proposals on a per company basis from two to one.52 In 
doing so, the Commission provided no specific examples of abuse by 
shareholders involving the submission of multiple proposals to the same 
company. The amendments more generally focused on the costs associ-
ated with the number of proposals.53 As one issuer reported, the cost of 
including each proposal in proxy statements was $22,450 while the cost 
of exclusion was $3,740.54  
The Staff initially did not support the reduction, noting that the 
change would result in a minimal decrease in the number of proposals55 
and negatively impact the quality of submissions.56 Ultimately, that 
changed, though the shift in position lacked “a great deal of convic-
tion.”57 Nonetheless, the Commission adopted the amendment.58 Submis-
sion of only a single proposal would decrease issuer costs and allow for 
more efficient and effective communication between shareholders and 
corporate management while maintaining proponents’ access to proxy 
  
 50. Of the 991 proposals submitted in 1981, 387 were contested by issuers and 211 were 
excluded from proxy statements. Out of the 211 proposals, none were excluded in regards to the 
limited number exclusion. In 1982, out of the 850 proposals submitted, 156 were excluded. It was 
found that one shareholder submitted 14 proposals, in contravention of the limited number require-
ment. Proposed Amendments to Rule 14a-8 Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Relating to 
Proposals by Security Holders, SEC Release No. 34-19,135, 26 SEC Docket 494 (Oct. 14, 1982).  
 51. The seven proponents submitted 537 proposals out of 991 (54.19%) in 1981 and 510 out 
of 973 (52.42%) in 1982. Liebeler, supra note 17, at 466 app. table 2. Of note, the total proposals by 
the SEC in 1982 (850, supra note 51) differs from the total reported by Liebeler.  
 52. The Commission, referring to comments similar to that of J.F. Shanklin (supra note 33), 
claimed the proposed changes were in response to shareholder abuse related to proponents utilizing 
the Rule as “a publicity mechanism to further personal interest” and increased “pressure placed upon 
the existing mechanism by the large number of proposals submitted each year and the increasing 
complexity of the issues involved. SEC Release No. 34-19,135, supra at *3.  
 53. Id.  
 54. Id.; Cost data was provided by American Telephone & Telegraph Company (“AT&T”), 
which provided the following calculations: (costs based on approximately 2, 903, 000 shareholders 
to be supplied with statements) Included Proposal – $13, 800 Postage + $60, 000 Printing + $38, 450 
Employee remuneration + $0 Counsel = $112, 250/5 Proposals = $22, 450 Estimated average cost 
per proposal. Excluded Proposal - $ 0 Postage + $0 Printing + $38, 450 Employee remuneration + 
$2, 700 Counsel = $41, 150/11 Proposals = $3, 740 Estimated average cost per proposal. 
 55. Memorandum from Morely and Kargula, supra at 9. 
 56. The Staff expressed concern that proponents attempting to condense multiple points into a 
single proposal would increase confusion and complexity of proposal review. Memorandum from 




 57. Memorandum from The Division of Corporate Finance, supra at 11.  
 58. Amendments to Rule 14a-8 Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Relating to Pro-
posals by Security Holders, Release No 34-20,091, 28 SEC Docket 798 (Aug. 16, 1983).  
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statements.59 In 1998 the Commission rewrote the Rule in plain English, 
making no substantive changes to the limitation on the number of pro-
posals.60 
III. STAFF INTERPRETATION  
The limitation to a single proposal continues to raise a number of is-
sues. Under the interpretation first set out in Newmont Mining,61 a pro-
posal can count as more than a single submission to the extent it includes 
multiple distinct and separate business items.62 The Staff has also contin-
ued to permit exclusion where issuers relied upon attribution under a 
theory of control or alter ego. The burden of proof, however, has re-
mained with the issuer.  
Section 3.01 Alter Ego and Control  
Issuers have continued to seek exclusion of proposals from multiple 
shareholders under an alter ego theory.63 This theory depends upon a 
showing of direct influence over the shares or the person submitting the 
proposal.64 The issue typically arises where the issuer has alleged joint 
activity by a number of proponents all under common control. In general, 
a finding of control or alter ego will result in the exclusion of proposals 
submitted by the entire group.65  
The Staff applied the alter ego approach in Staten Island.66 A pro-
ponent submitted five proposals on corporate governance issues but 
withdrew four of them following notice of a violation of the one proposal 
limitation. Thereafter, family and neighbors of the same shareholder 
submitted proposals to the same issuer. The issuer claimed the propo-
nent’s agenda, evidenced by submissions over previous years, persisted 
in each of the submissions. Moreover, the proposals were identical to 
those that had been withdrawn. The Staff found the combined evidence 
sufficient proof of the proponent’s control of others with the intent to 
“circumvent the proxy rules.” In contrast, the Staff has not found mini-
  
 59. Per the SEC, in fact “the proposed reduction…is one way to reduce issuer costs and to 
improve the readability of proxy statements without substantially limiting the ability of proponents 
to bring important issues to the shareholder body at large.” Id. at 990.  
 60. Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Release No. 34-40,018, 67 SEC Docket 
373, 1998 WL 254809 (May 21, 1998).  
 61. See supra notes 40-42.  
 62. E.g., Pacific Enterprises, SEC No-Action Letter, 1998 WL 75864 (Feb. 19, 1998); Occi-
dental Petroleum Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1998 WL 88063 (Feb. 23, 1998).  
 63. Of the 81 NALs claiming alter-ego or control tactics between 1998 and 2016, the Staff 
agreed with issuer claims in 11.  
 64. E.g., Storage Technology Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1998 WL 111144 (Mar. 11, 
1998); Alaska Air Group, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2009 WL 829060 (Mar. 5, 2009).  
 65. In the exception, MOD-PAC, the issuer received permission to omit only the proposal 
submitted via share control. The proposal submitted by the proponent utilizing his qualifying shares 
remained in the proxy materials. MOD-PAC Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2004 WL 495653 (Mar. 
8, 2004).  
 66. Staten Island Bancorp, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2002 WL 32166624 (Feb. 27, 2002).  
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mal statements of personal or institutional relationships and the use of 
common addresses as sufficient evidence of control or alter ego.67  
Issuers have also sought to apply the alter ego theory in connection 
with proposals submitted by persons affiliated with unions, though with-
out much success. In Crown Central Petroleum Corp., proponents, 
members of the same workers’ union, submitted proposals with respect 
to their own stock holdings.68 At the time of submission, the company 
was involved in a “protracted labor dispute.” The issuer, citing their con-
nection to the union, argued that the proponents were participating in an 
“orchestrated campaign” promoted by the union.69 The shareholders, 
however, asserted that the company had not produced “direct evidence” 
of control. The Staff agreed with the shareholders and did not permit 
exclusion.  
The issue has also arisen in connection with a shareholder’s desig-
nation of another individual as a proxy to submit a proposal. In Boeing, a 
proxy submitted six separate proposals to an issuer in the same year, 
each for a different eligible shareholder.70 The company claimed that 
proxies utilized the “tactic to inundate” issuers with proposals in a “clear 
and egregious abuse” of the Rule.71 The Staff, however, denied omission. 
Only where a proxy provided inadequate proof of authorized status did 
the Staff permit exclusion.72    
Section 3.02 Substantially Distinct Issues 
A proposal containing substantially distinct and separate issues can 
constitute more than a single submission, though the Staff has provided 
minimal insight into the matter.73 For proposals addressing multiple mat-
ters, the Staff generally does not permit exclusion where they relate to a 
unifying concept. For instance, the Staff also declined to permit the ex-
  
 67. E.g., The Charles Schwab Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2014 WL 69538 (Feb. 8, 2014); 
North Bancshares, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1998 WL 40249 (Jan. 29, 1998).  
 68. Crown Central Petroleum Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1998 WL 111130 (Mar. 10, 
1998).  
 69. The Company alleged a number of connections between the union and the individually 
submitted proposals. See Id. “The union mark is all over the three Proposals. The format of each 
proposal is substantially the same. The Gilchrest and McDowell Proposals attached hereto bear the 
fax transmittal notation “FROM OCAW LOCAL 4-227.” The transmittal letters from all three 
Proponents refer to a single attorney, Matthew Haiken, who also represented Alvin Freeman, another 
locked out OCAW member, whose shareholder proposal last year was excluded by Crown from its 
1997 proxy, with the concurrence of the staff of the Division”. Id at *4.  
 70. The Boeing Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2001 WL 122000 (Feb. 7, 2001).  
 71. See id. at 3; see also, Southwest Airlines Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2002 WL 833590 
(Mar. 25, 2002); Northrop Grumman Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2002 WL 730716 (Mar. 22, 
2002). The SEC denied omission under the limited number procedural requirement.  
 72. The proponent submitted one proposal for himself and a second for joint-owners. The 
letter provided by the proponent declaring authorization to submit on behalf of the joint-owners was 
not signed, presumably indicating he was attempting to control the shares without authorization. 
MOD-PAC, supra note 66.  
 73. The Staff has not clarified their interpretation of substantially distinct and separate issues 
in any Bulletins or releases. Any understanding of this distinction is derived from analysis of NALs.  
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clusion of a request for the adoption of equal employment principles 
containing eight actionable processes.74  
Application of the unifying concept, however, has varied. Govern-
ance submissions, for example, often involve a unifying theme.75 In some 
cases, the unifying concept prevents exclusion. A submission requesting 
an elimination of the supermajority vote coupled with the adoption of a 
simple majority vote constituted a single proposal.76 The Staff found that 
a request to require a majority of independent directors, who would meet 
separately and elect an independent Chairman, and the creation of a nom-
inating committee constituted a single proposal.77 So did a submission 
requesting a retroactive and prospective application of a two-thirds vote 
for changes to the bylaws.78 The Staff viewed a proposal that combined a 
request for annual elections of board members and term limits79, and a 
proposal calling for annual election of the board and the requirement that 
nominees maintain a certain amount of stock80 as single proposals.  
In other instances involving corporate governance, however, the 
Staff has permitted exclusion. A proposal sought to implement share-
holder access. In addition, the proposal also provided that the election of 
a majority of the board “under these provisions shall be considered to not 
be a change in control by the Company, its board and officers.” The staff 
treated the change of control as a “separate and distinct” matter and per-
mitted exclusion.81 So did a proposal requesting an increase of the num-
ber of directors combined with a mechanism for filling any vacancies.82 
  
 74. The staff disagreed that a proposal providing for a shareholder vote on a poison pill and 
the right of directors “to set the earliest election date” contained multiple business items. Intel Corp., 
SEC No-Action Letter, 2015 WL 186749 (Fe. 11, 2015); see also PACCAR Inc., SEC No-Action 
Letter, 2004 WL 224507 (Jan. 5, 2004).  
 75. The Staff’s application of a unifying theme also applies in the context of public policy 
related proposals. A submission requesting a review or amendment of standards for international 
operations and a summary report of this review, as well as an account of four specific human rights 
topics, constituted a single proposal. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1999 WL 
15951 (Jan. 14, 1999). So did a request for the adoption of human rights principles, consisting of 
eight guidelines. Yahoo! Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2011 WL 494129 (Apr. 5, 2011). The Staff, 
however, found a submission requiring a larger number of nominees than board seats and that the 
nominees come from a diverse background constituted multiple proposals. Exxon Mobile Corp., 
SEC No-Action Letter, 2002 WL 597371 (Mar. 19, 2002).  
 76. Britton & Koontz Capital Corp., SEC No Action Letter, 2006 WL 475444 (Feb. 22, 
2006).  
 77. Quality Systems, Inc., SEC No Action Letter, 1999 WL 376097 (Jun. 9, 1999).  
 78. Global Entertainment Holdings/Equities, Inc., SEC No Action Letter, 2003 WL 22204506 
(Jul. 10, 2003). 
 79. The Boeing Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1999 WL 105014 (Feb. 23, 1999). 
 80. Washington Mutual Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2004 WL 5228554 (Feb. 20, 2004).  
 81. Bank of America Corp., SEC No Action Letter, 2012 WL 91383 (Mar. 7, 2012) (“In 
arriving at this position, we note that paragraphs one through five and seven of the submission con-
tain a proposal relating to the inclusion of shareholder nominations for director in Bank of America's 
proxy materials and paragraph six of the submission contains a proposal relating to events that 
would not be considered a change in control. We concur with your view that paragraph six contains 
a proposal that constitutes a separate and distinct matter from the proposal relating to the inclusion of 
shareholder nominations for director in Bank of America's proxy materials.”).  
 82. HealthSouth Corp., SEC No Action Letter, 2006 WL 845605 (Mar. 28, 2006).  
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Likewise, the Staff determined that a proposal involving independent 
directors and the number of directors lacked a unifying theme. 83 
The Staff has continued to apply the “unifying theme” concept but 
continued to do so in an unclear fashion. Some proposals that appear to 
involve such a theme have been excluded. The Staff considered a sub-
mission seeking multiple edits to the proxy materials as containing sepa-
rate and distinct issues.84 A submission regarding “restructuring” of the 
company with seven actions, including the separation of subsidiaries, 
also comprised multiple proposals.85  
Section 3.03 Revisions and Subsequent Submissions 
The limit on the number of proposals applies to submissions, irre-
spective of the timing. Where, for example, a shareholder submits a sec-
ond proposal after omission of the first from the proxy materials, the 
Staff will permit exclusion. For example, in Citigroup a proponent sub-
mitted a proposal and the company obtained no-action release permitting 
exclusion.86 The shareholder then submitted a second proposal on an 
unrelated topic. The Staff permitted exclusion, noting “the proponent 
previously submitted a proposal for inclusion in Citigroup’s proxy mate-
rials with respect to the same meeting.”87  
Different versions of the same proposal submitted prior to expira-
tion of required deadlines, however, did not violate the limitation. In-
stead, the Staff treats the proposal as a revision rather than as a second 
submission. At one time, the Staff concluded that the issuer did not have 
  
 83. Streamline Health Solutions, Inc., SEC No Action Letter, 2010 WL 302777 (Mar. 23, 
2010) (“In arriving at this position, we particularly note that the proposal relating to director inde-
pendence involves a separate and distinct matter from the proposals relating to the number of direc-
tors, the conditions for changing the number of directors, and the voting threshold for the election of 
directors at the upcoming annual meeting.”).  
 84. The proposal requested edits to the proxy materials, including changing the word “except” 
to “against” in the Vote for Directors column and removing the statement that all signed but unvoted 
proxies would be voted at Management’s discretion. The issuer argued the elements were not suffi-
ciently related to comprise a single proposal. General Motors Corp., SEC No Action Letter, 2002 
WL 417370 (Feb. 23, 2002).  
 85. General Motors Corp., SEC No Action Letter, 2007 WL 1125500 (Apr. 9, 2007).  
 86. Citigroup Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2002 WL 523424 (Mar. 7, 2002).  
 87. Id. at *1.  
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to accept the revisions.88 That, however, changed.89 Issuers now must 
accept revisions provided prior to the company’s deadline.90  
IV. ANALYSIS  
The staff’s interpretation of the one proposal requirement has re-
sulted in uncertainty and an unnecessary waste of resources. By looking 
to whether a proposal contains “distinct issues,” the test implicates most 
proposals. In part, this occurs because proposals must address both the 
substance of the matter and the process for implementation.91 In other 
instances, the proposal would not function adequately without considera-
tion of multiple issues. Separation of chair of the Board and CEO is one 
goal but shareholders typically also want to ensure that only independent 
directors occupy the position. Requiring the exclusion of one of these 
issues would result in an ineffective proposal. As a result, issuers regu-
larly challenge proposals under this provision, requiring the expenditure 
of corporate, shareholder, and staff time to resolve.92  
A broader interpretation of the unifying theme would address some 
of these resource issues by providing greater certainty and reducing the 
number of needless no-action requests. Proposals containing a unifying 
concept, such as board elections, with multiple actionable items should 
comprise a single business item. Access proposals would generate the 
same result, even when addressing the consequences of the use of the 
provision in connection with a change of control. Under a broader con-
cept, a previously omitted submission requiring board member disclosure 
of conflicts and preexisting corporate interests, and tying compensation 
to company success interest equates a single proposal under director ac-
countability.93 Similarly, requests concerning shareholder voting94 or 
  
 88. Staff Bulletin 14, section E, question 2: “If a company has received a timely proposal and 
the shareholder makes revisions to the proposal before the company submits its no-action request, 
must the company accept those revisions? No, but it may accept the shareholder’s revisions. If the 
changes are such that the revised proposal is actually a different proposal from the original, the 
revised proposal could be subject to exclusion under . . . rule 14a-8(c).” SEC Staff Legal Bulletin 
No. 14 (CF), 2001 WL 34886112 (Jul. 13, 2001).  
 89. The deadline requires proposals to be received at the company within 120 calendar days 
of the date proxy materials were distributed the prior year. 17 CFR § 240.14a-8(ii)(C)(e)(2) (2016). 
 90. Id. Of note, the proponent is not required to label the second submission as a revision. 
However, if the second submission is affirmatively noted as an additional proposal for inclusion, this 
will be considered a second proposal in violation of the number limitation procedure.  
 91. The failure to specify any action designed for implementation may not qualify as a pro-
posal. See Long Drug Stores Corp., 2008 WL 224026 (Jan. 23, 2008) (“There appears to 
be some basis for your view that Longs may exclude the submission under rule 14a-8(a) because it 
does not recommend or require that Longs or its board of directors take any action.”).  
 92. Of the 109 NALs between 1998 and 2016 where issuers claimed a proposal contained 
multiple separate and distinct items, the Staff permitted omission in 40 responses. Of these 40, the 
entire proposal was omitted.  
 93. Duke Energy Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2009 WL 851487 (Feb. 27, 2009).  
 94. The proposal requested two changes to proxy materials addressing the manner of share-
holder voting for directors. The actions were unified under the broader ‘director elections’ concept. 
Ford Motor Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2002 WL 32075803 (Feb. 26, 2002).  
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board composition95 with multiple actions related to the broad concept 
should constitute a single submission.  
This approach would reduce uncertainty and needless requests with 
minimal effort by the Commission. At the same time, with shareholders 
having less concern over omission, the approach would potentially result 
in proposals that more fully addressed issues raised in any submission. 
Moreover, the existing administrative interpretation and the provisions of 
the Rule would minimize the risk of proposals containing truly unrelated 
topics. First, the proposal would still have to have a unifying theme. Sec-
ond, shareholders have a limit of 500 words, minimizing the number of 
topics that can be fully explored. Third, proposals with too many topics 
would likely generate shareholder concern and reduce support. At the 
same time, however, shareholders, rather than the Staff of the Commis-




 95. HealthSouth Corp., supra note 83. 
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